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“Golden Implication”
The Primary Foundations of the Eternity of Being
This essay aims at briefly presenting the numerous ways of indicating the eternity of being,
insofar as it is being, in line with what Emanuele Severino has shown in his works. In one of
his most recent works, Severino himself has named “golden” the implication of the eternity
of being on the part of the being itself of being. Such implication is at the core of his discourse
and multiple are the ways of its foundations. If we call “original tautology” the appearing of
the being itself of being, we can show that the ways of the golden implication depend on
the principle of universal opposition of the positive and the negative – the destiny of thought
– which is the law according to which Being shows itself in all of its forms. 
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First Part - ON THE ORIGINAL STRUCTURE
1. Introduction
The original structure is the structure that is not founded on anything
else, that is, of what is known through itself. What is not founded in
anything else is the appearing of being in the form of identity/non-
contradiction, so that we say that each being is identical to itself and it is
not other than itself. 
In the following I will call “original tautology” the appearing of the
being itself of being, its not being other than itself, with explicit reference
to Emanuele Severino’s works and the unprecedented sense of identity
that they suggest, a sense that is radically different from the way Western
thought has conceived of identity.
Plato, Aristotle, Hegel state the necessity of identity. Plato said that
not even in a dream we can be convinced that “one thing is other than
itself ” (Theaet., 190 b-c) and Aristotle shows that it is impossible “to
suppose that the same thing is and is not” (Metaph., 1005 b 11-34). Hegel
calls “Tautologie” the essence of the dialectical method (cf. Science of
Logic, Introduction), that is therefore the affirmation of identity.
However, according to the Western tradition, things are engaged in
the process of becoming – they are generated and they perish – and this
entails the persuasion that the things are essentially “nothing”. In fact,
the Western tradition is the failed attempt to think identity: it wants to
affirm the identity of beings, but, precisely because it thinks the becoming
of beings, in its subconscious the Western thought thinks the identity of
what is not identical (Being and Nothing), that is, the negation of
identity. 
Instead, the “original tautology” is the appearing of the identity of
each and every being as it implicates in various ways (as we will see) the
eternity of all beings. The “golden implication” – concept which is at the
core of Emanuele Severino’s writings – is precisely the implication of the
eternity of being (of each and every being, of any determination-that-is)
on the part of the being itself of being. 
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2. “Identity of the identity with itself” and “élenchos”
1. In order to fine-tune our subject, it can be useful to clarify certain
aspects of this discourse that are already present in Severino’s fundamental
work The Original Structure. 
We define “being” as every “that which is”, where “that which”
indicates the essence, whereas “is” indicates being a not-nothing on the
part of the essence. In The Essence of Nihilism, Severino himself explains
that the term “essence” is to be considered in its transcendental sense: in
fact, “essence” refers to every semantic dimension, to everything that is
not nothing. The same applies to “Being” that means being a not-nothing
on the part of the totality of whatever is not nothing – and therefore on
the part of each determination and of the totality of determinations.
In The Original Structure, it is claimed that being is immediately a
syntactical constant of every meaning, and that means that “it is
immediately self-contradictory that any determination – that any
positivity – is not” (Severino, 1981, p. 499). Of each semantic content
(x), and therefore also of the Semantic whole, being (ɛ) is immediately
predicated, with this important clarification: essence and existence cannot
be presupposed by their synthesis. In fact, being cannot be predicated of
an essence that is separated from being; by contrast, it is of the essence
that is already originally in synthesis with being (x=ɛ), that being (ɛ) is
predicated, and the being that is predicated is precisely the being of the
essence (ɛ=x).
I am referring to that concrete formulation of identity that is
investigated in chapter III of The Original Structure, where it is shown
that identity is to be understood as “identity of the identity with itself ”.
In the case of the existential assessment that we are considering, we will
thus obtain the formula: 
(x=ɛ)=(ɛ=x).
The subject to which the predicate refers is not the pure subject
isolated from the predicate, and the predicate is not the pure predicate
isolated from the subject. Therefore, the “identity” is not the outcome of
the thought’s unifying act, which identifies contradictorily the non-
identical (the subject and the predicate that are originally separate), rather
it is the appearing of the identity of identical, that is, the identity between
the synthesis of the subject and the predicate and the synthesis of the
predicate and the subject.
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2. Also by way of introduction – in order to clarify further parts of
the analysis –, it must be pointed out that the original structure is not an
arbitrary presupposition. 
In other words, it is a matter of understanding why the Being’s identity
with itself must be affirmed and the identity of Being and not-Being
cannot be affirmed:
Replying to this question means effecting the authentic
unconcealment of the truth of Being, which is not a simple saying,
but is a saying that has value; a saying, that is, capable of
superseding [negating] its own negation (and so of superseding
any particular form that negation may assume). The affirmation
that Being is not not-Being must, unquestionably, be denied as
long as its value in not seen. In the meantime, this affirmation is
like an invincible sword in the hand of someone who does not
know he has an invincible sword: such a swordsman will be struck
down at the first encounter. And rightly so: a “truth” that cannot
hold its ground is not a truth (Severino, 2016a, p. 59).
The original structure is not simply the appearing of the being itself
of being, but to it also essentially belongs the appearing of being itself as
that whose negation is self-negation.
This is the topic of the “élenchos”, which is the core of the entire
discourse. Briefly, it can be formulated as follows: the negation of being
itself of being – and therefore the negation of the opposition between any
being and what is other than such being – is itself a determinate being
which opposes itself to everything that is other than itself. This means
that the negation of the being itself of being is founded on what it negates,
that is, it negates that without which the negation could not be as such,
so that it is a way of saying that includes the declaration of its own non-
existence:
The élenchos is precisely this ascertainment of this self-supersession
of the negation; i.e. the ascertainment that the negation does not
exist as pure negation – as negation that, in order to constitute
itself, has no need to affirm that which it denies. Saying that
opposition “cannot” be denied thus means ascertaining that,
precisely because the ground of the negation is that which it
denies, the negation consists in the negation of itself, in its
superseding itself as discourse (Severino, 2016a, pp. 62-63).
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And the “original tautology” is not something controvertible, deniable,
precisely because it is not separated from the appearing of the “élenchos”:
the opposition between every being and its other, and thus also the
opposition of every being to nothing, shows itself as the same “breath of
thought” (Severino, 2016a, p. 79).
3. The identity of essence with existence and the Law of Being
1. We have said that being is predicated of every semantic content and
therefore also of the Semantic whole.
Now we add that the logically immediate propositions are such insofar
as they relate to the universal formulation of the principle of identity
(non-contradiction): we say “A is A” (thus predicating “A” ’s being), not
because being identical to itself is “A” ’s prerogative, so that considering
“B” we cannot say that “B is B”, but because both “A” and “B” are
individualizations of the universal – that is, of Being – to which essentially
belongs the being identical to itself. And conversely, Being is identical to
itself “not because identity is a property of Being, understood as an
abstract or formal universal […], regardless of the concrete content of
this formality, but because Being is the concrete universal […], namely
because the formal element is put in its relation to the specific content”
(Severino, 1981, pp. 321-322).
It follows that “A” is not “for itself ” identical to itself but “for other”,
where this other is the concrete universal that includes “A”. The same
applies to “B”:
The L-immediate [logically immediate] identity is thus only the
identity of the concrete, and this identity is expressed by the
proposition “the whole is the whole”, the whole being precisely
Being as concrete universal […]. On this side, this is the only
analytical proposition, or there is no other analytical proposition
but this one: in fact, to pose A as the individuation of the concrete
universal, and pose B as the individuation of the concrete
universal, means posing the same content, i.e., the concrete
universal. This does not mean that A’s identity with itself does not
differ in any way from B’s identity with itself: the two identities
are clearly different, but both, as L-immediate identities, essentially
imply a term – the universal, the whole – that comprises both
identities, so that their concrete meaning is the same (Severino,
1981, pp. 323-324). 
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Therefore, the proposition “the whole is the whole” (where “whole” is
to be understood as the totality of the positive) conveys the same logical
immediacy, and it is tantamount to the proposition “Being is”, where
“Being” is to be understood as the same semantic whole that in itself
includes the totality of the logically immediate connections. The
proposition “Being is” – which predicates the being of the concrete
universal that is identical to itself – is thus the same principle of identity
and non-contradiction. Indeed, such principle has a value that is
essentially ontological: it is not only a norm for thought, but it is the law
for Being itself. 
The meaning of the “original tautology” (the being itself of being) that
I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, saying that it implies the
eternity of being, is now clearer. The Original Structure’s main point
emphasizes:
That Being has to be resides in the very meaning of Being;
wherefore the principle of non-contradiction expresses not simply
the identity of essence with itself (or its difference from other
essences), but rather the identity of essence with existence (or the
otherness of essence with respect to non-existence). (Severino,
1981, p. 517).
This means that the identity of the essence with itself must not be isolated
from the identity of essence and existence. The identity of essence and
existence is to be understood in the sense that “in the meaning of the
determination (essence), of which the being (existence) is predicated, the
being (the positivity, the existence) of the determination is originally
included” (Severino, 1981, p. 517). Essence is in fact different from
existence but, as we already know, being different does not mean being
separated. 
Hence Being’s immutability: to say that Being becomes (that is, that
goes from not-Being to Being and vice versa) “means to say that Being is
not: it is not, either at the beginning or at the end of becoming. These
both in the case that becoming of the whole is becoming […] of the
whole as such, and in the case that becoming of the whole is becoming
of one moment or one aspect of the whole […]. All this can be expressed
by saying that Being is eternal”(Severino, 1981, p. 520).
We can sum it up as follows: of the whole of Being, and of one
moment of the whole (for instance, this pen, this supervening noise…)
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we cannot think that before they were and after they will not be. Thinking
that Being is generated is the same as thinking that Being is nothing, and
the same is to be said if the Being is corrupted: it is nothing at the
beginning of becoming and it is nothing at the end of becoming.
To think of Being’s birth and death means to think of the time in
which being is absolutely other than itself, that is, the negation of that
being itself of the being, the negation of which is self-negation.
Everything is eternal. And yet becoming appears. So how are we to
understand becoming? Severino writes: “If the impossibility of Being’s
not-being is not recognized, one will be left without the slightest suspicion
that the authentic content of Appearing is radically altered by defining
the Becoming that appears as an annulment of Being, or as Being’s
emerging from nothingness”.
In truth, “what appears is not Being’s issuing from and returning to
nothingness, but rather its appearing and disappearing,” therefore, “if
Becoming is defined as the process of the revelation of Being […] then
Being’s immutability and its Becoming non longer rank as mutually
contradictory terms” (Severino, 2016a, pp. 107-112).
2. The Western tradition has not been able to think identity because
it has always understood Being as something that is in time:
Aristotle’s argument (later to be repeated by Aristotelians and
Scholastics past and present) that when Being is, it is, and when
Being is-not, it is-not, therefore states that when Being is Nothing,
then it is nothing. But in this discourse, then, one fails to see that
the real danger that must be avoided lies not in affirming that
when Being is nothing, it is Being (and, when Being is Being, it is
nothing), but rather in admitting that Being is nothing. The real
danger lies in assenting to a time when Being in not Nothing (i.e.,
when it is), and a time when Being is nothing (i.e. when it is-not),
in admitting, that is, that Being is in time. In this way, the
“principle of non-contradiction” itself becomes the worst form of
contradiction: precisely because contradiction is concealed in the
very formula that was designed to avoid it and to banish it from
Being (Severino, 2016a, pp. 38-39).
If Being is in time, there is a time in which Being is not, in which the
positive is the negative: the time of the absurd. However, the “original
tautology” – the appearing of the being itself of being –implies the
eternity of everything that is, its not being in time, and thus expresses a
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sense of identity and non-contradiction that is essentially different from
the temporal understanding of Being. 
It must be pointed out that the so-called principle of identity and
principle of non-contradiction are moments of the logical immediacy:
Being is identical to itself because it is not a not-Being, and Being is not
a not-Being because it is identical to itself, therefore “a logical priority of
one over the other is to be ruled out: the two sides of the principle are
immediately connected and thus none of them is something mediated
from the other” (Severino, 1981, p. 175).
Being itself of being that is separated (isolated) from its being negation
of its own other, is not a being itself. The real meaning of the original
tautology is expressed in the universal opposition of positive and negative.
Already in The Essence of Nihilism Severino conceived of it as the “law of
Being [...], the destiny of thought, and thought is always witness to this
law; always affirming it, even when ignorant of it or when denying
it”(Severino, 2016a, pp. 64-65).
If Being is the positive, then the negative is the non-positive, i.e.,
everything that in different ways is other than the positive in question.
We understand now that the opposition of Being and Nothing is one of
the ways in which the positive is opposed to the negative: “the negative
is not simply the pure Nothing (Parmenides), but is also the other positive
(Plato)” (Severino, 2016a, pp. 46-47). In fact, “the denial of the not-
being of Being […] is an individuation of the universal opposition of the
positive and the negative”, because “in the original opposition, every
Being (and the totality of Being) turns in a number of directions – it
enters into a plurality of relationships” (Severino, 2016a, p. 80), and this
plurality of directions or relationships is precisely the plurality of ways
according to which every positive is opposed to its negative.
4. The main modes of the golden implication
The identity of being and its necessary implications are constitutive of
the semantic-syntactical horizon that Severino calls “persyntactic field”,
where the term “persyntax” means the authentic transcendental, the
syntax of all the syntaxes, that is, the set of meanings and relationships
that has to necessarily appear in order for every being to appear. 
The being itself of being insofar as it is being is the fundamental
persyntactic determination, in the sense that all the other persyntactic
determinations are traits of the concreteness of the being itself of being.
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Among the necessary implications, the most remarkable one – already in
The Original Structure, but even before then (cf. Severino, 1958) – so
much that it deserves the name of “golden” (Severino, 2015, p. 95), is
the already pointed out implication between the appearing of the being
itself of being and the eternity of every being. 
We have found that if Being became – if it was born or if it died –
Being would not be: becoming nothing and becoming from nothing imply
a time in which Being is not. It is the “primary” foundation of the eternity
of beings. It is called “primary” because it is based on nothing but the
original structure, i.e., on the appearing of the incontrovertible original
tautology. 
In what follows I will briefly mention the other ways of indicating the
eternity of being, namely the main modes of the golden implication. 
a) We have seen that the being itself of being (its being other than
what is other than itself, its being other than nothing) is a necessary
connection, something that cannot be other than how it is. But a
necessary connection is an eternal connection: it is impossible for a time
or a situation in which this connection is not to exist because we would
have a necessary connection that is not a necessary connection. Therefore
“it is impossible that any being [that is a being itself, i.e., a necessary
connection] begins and ends being itself […]. This impossibility is the
eternity of being insofar as it is being” (Severino, 2015, p. 177).
We have here another formulation of the golden implication: another
primary path that leads to the same statement (asserting the eternity of
being), starting, in this case, by considering the necessity of the original
connection. 
b) If now we look at the “result” of becoming other, we find that in it
(in the result) there is not only the other, but there is also the having
become other on the part of the being that becomes. For example: in the
result of becoming ash on the part of the wood, there is not only the ash,
but also the having become ash on the part of the wood, an impossible
identification of non-identical. 
We can think of avoiding the contradiction by saying that, in the
becoming ash on the part of the wood, the wood becomes nothing.
However, by saying that, we are doubling the “folly” of becoming other:
we end up thinking not only that in the result of becoming, wood is other
than itself because it is identical to the other positive, i.e., the ash, but
also that the wood is other than itself because it is identical to its absolute
other, which is nothing. And for this becoming to happen it is also
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necessary that the ash emerge from nothing: at a certain point, nothing
becomes ash, so the result of this becoming from nothing is the being ash
on the part of nothing. 
The first way in which we observe that the beginning and the end of
becoming as such imply the identification of being and nothing, is
combined with this additional primary foundation of the eternity of
being (cf. Severino 1992, First Part, chap. I; 1995, chaps. I and II), which
establishes the impossible identity in the result of becoming nothing or
becoming from nothing.“ This, even if in the becoming nothing (or from
nothing) the identity of being and nothing is more primary that the
identity that is present in the result of becoming nothing (or from
nothing), because […] becoming from nothing implies a time (the
beginning of this becoming) in which the being is still nothing (is
identical to nothing) and becoming nothing implies a time (the result of
this becoming) in which the being is nothing” (Severino, 2015, p. 138).
By further investigating the structure of becoming, Severino has
identified other primary ways of meaning of the eternity of being.
c) Let us consider the process of becoming other on the part of being
X. Because this process is not a nothing, but it is a being that is other
than X, it follows that, from the beginning, such process is already the
having become other on the part of X: “this means that, in the process of
becoming other, the being becomes other (the other consisting in the
process) when it has not become other yet. At the same time it becomes
other (the other that is at the beginning of the process of becoming other)
without having become other (the other that should be the result of the
process of becoming other). The becoming other is the negation of
becoming other” (Severino, 2015, pp. 295-296).
Also this shows that becoming other is something contradictory,
because it negates the being itself of being, “where the being that is not
itself is precisely the becoming other” (Severino, 2015, p. 296). However
the impossibility for every being to become other is the same necessity
that every being is eternal. 
d) Let us consider now that in the becoming Y on the part of X, it is
necessary not only that X becomes Y, but also (syn-chronically) that Y
becomes X. If Y did not become X, Y would be separated from X, that
could not become Y, “so that a being, becoming other, becomes itself,
that is, it does not become other” (Severino, 2015, p. 149. The same
remark is found also in Severino 2011, chap. X, par. III).
This is another configuration of the contradictory nature of becoming
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other: a being that, in becoming other, does not become its other, is a
negation of the being itself of being, and this means that this is “an
additional foundation of the necessity of the eternity of every being”
(Severino, 2016b, p. 239), an additional primary foundation of the
eternity of being insofar as it is being.
e) Finally, let us consider becoming as a transition from potential being
to actual being, for example, the becoming where a block of marble is
transformed into a statue by an artist. In this case we say that the statue
is “potentially” in the block of marble. But its being “potentially” means
that the actuality of the specific shape of the statue is still nothing: if at
least certain aspects of the statue weren’t still nothing, the statue would
already be in actuality and there would be no transition from potentiality
to actuality. 
Therefore, the becoming from potentiality to actuality is a transition
in which something that is still nothing (nihil absolutum) becomes a
being. And this transition is “a ‘third’ with respect to nothing and being
[…]. Because it affirms a ‘third’, and thus it negates the being itself of
being, the concept of becoming is self-contradictory, that is, also for this
reason becoming […] is impossible (it is the negation of the being itself
of being). The impossibility of becoming is the necessity of not becoming
of beings, i.e., the necessity of the eternity of each and every being”
(Severino, 2016b, pp. 227-228).
And this is another primary way of the eternity of beings implied in
the original structure of the identity.
5. An additional foundation of the eternity of being
The golden segment of the persyntax shows in numerous ways its own
necessity. The primary path suggested by Severino in his earlier writings
– the path that negates the ontological form of becoming other – appears
to be “surrounded” by other paths, suggested by our philosopher in his
later writings (and summed up for the first time in Severino 2015, Third
Part, chap. I). They are primary paths as well because, as we have seen, in
them as well the persyntactic determination of the eternity of every being
is implied by the appearing of the being itself of being. 
There is an additional foundation of the eternity of being that is
subordinate to the primary path, a path about which is spoken for the
first time in Dike. Let us call (e)S the eternity of that certain being which
is the original structure, and (e)BB the eternity of being insofar as it is
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being. In this additional (but subordinate) path we start with the
observation of (e)S – which is asserted on the foundation of (e)BB – and
we show that (e)S, insofar as it is distinct from the foundation of (e)BB,
implies (e)BB.
The argument can be summed up as follows: the eternal is a rule that
anticipates the future and preserves the past. We say that (e)S implies
(e)BB because “if beings that become other by coming from nothing and
returning to nothing existed, (e)S would anticipate their being nothing
and it would not let them go through the nothing of the past; (e)S would
be that Law of the Eternal that presents itself, and necessarily, as the
entification of nothing”(Severino, 2015, p. 196).
What occurs is a sort of inversion of the underlying trend of
contemporary thought, according to which the faith in the existence of
becoming implies the affirmation of the non-existence of the immutable:
“while in the faith of becoming other the entification of nothing makes
impossible the becoming other that in this faith is considered as absolutely
undeniable evidence, so that such faith in the becoming arrives at
negating each and every Eternal, vice versa (and here is the inversion…)
in the implication of (e)BB on the part of (e)S, the negation of becoming
other implied by (e)S does not imply the negation of every ‘Eternal’, but
it implies, by contrast, the negation of every becoming other, that is, it
implies the eternity of every being” (Severino, 2015, p. 198).
6. The fundamental semantic-syntactic structure
If now we go back to analyze the original tautology, to summarize and
develop what has been saidregarding the authentic structure of the
identity of being, we find that it is precisely the concrete formulation of
the identity – the concrete sense of being itself of being, understood as
identity of the identity with itself – that implies the eternity of everything
that is.
We have said that in the being, i.e., in “that which is”, being (ɛ) is not
separated from the essence (x), neither is the essence separated from being:
it is of every “that which is” that being is predicated, in the form that we
already know: (x=ɛ)=(ɛ=x). And it is precisely of the “being-that-is” that
its not being separated from its being identical to itself is affirmed. In
formula:
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[(x=ɛ)]=(ɛ=x)]=[(x=ɛ)]=(ɛ=x)]
Severino writes:
But the original and necessary unity of “that which” and its “is” is
the eternity of “that which” –  of every “that which”. And the
appearing of such unity is a primary foundation of eternity,
additional to that which appears almost since the beginning in my
writings […]. Such additional foundation is not based on the
exclusion that the “that which” is nothing – as by contrast the
primary foundation of eternity that appears in my earlier writings
is – but it is based on the exclusion that the Being of “that which”
[…] is the Being of nothing, i.e., it is based on the exclusion that
the nothing is (Severino, 2016b, p. 223).
Isolated from its own Being, the being is a nothing of which, at a later
stage, the being is affirmed: the isolation of the terms implies that their
union is the identification of the non-identicals (cf. Severino, 1995, chap.
XIV). But it is impossible that the nothing is.
For example, to say that “this pen is” means to say that this pen is
eternally, not only because it is impossible that there is a situation in
which being is nothing (as it is already said in The Original Structure) but
also because it is impossible that the Being of being is the Being of
nothing, “even if […] the exclusion that the ‘that which’ (being) is
nothing implies the exclusion that the nothing is being” (Severino, 2016b,
p. 223).
And because the being itself of being is structured as “universal
opposition of the positive and the negative” – and in the plurality of ways
in which every positive is opposed to its own negative, and thus also to
nothing, – it is precisely under this fundamental semantic-syntactic
structure that the paths of the “golden implication” fall. 
7. Conclusion
We have seen that the ways of the golden implication are numerous. The
language encounters first one way, and then the other: first, in the way
suggested by Severino in The Original Structure, then in those suggested
in later writings. 
Because every being is eternal, also the coming forth of being is eternal:
55e&cGiulio Goggi •
Not even the synthesis between the being that happens and its
happening can not-be (that is, be nothing). But in saying that the
being that comes into the appearing could have not come into it
(or that the being that did not appear could have appeared) – by
affirming the “contingency of the appearing” – we say that the
being that happens could have not happened, that is, we negate
the necessity of the happening. In this way the not-being (that is,
the nothingness) of the happening of being is posed as a possibility.
The impossibility is regarded as possible (Severino, 1980, p. 98).
                                                                                                         
Therefore, it is necessary for beings not only to come forth, but also
to come forth exactly as they come forth. (The foundation of the necessity
of happening consists of numerous paths as well. Cf. Severino, 2015,
Third Part, chap. II). And because everything happens by necessity, the
succession in the linguistic exposition of the different ways of the
foundation of the eternity of being is also necessary. Because there is no
chance in the succession of events, it cannot be accidental that the same
theory can be demonstrated in different ways.
Moreover, because it is impossible that the different ways of the golden
implication are separated one from the other – otherwise they would be
separated from the original meaning that implies all the different ways –
it can be said that they all belong to the incontrovertible structure of the
persyntax, that has always shined before the intellect, and that in the law
of the universal opposition of the Positive and the Negative has its
radiating core. 
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